) the business-men, as a stock-holder, invested in the submarine telegraph companies, which represented a high market risk but it also represented a big return. In the paper one will concentrate on the Great Britain case where many connections existed among these two kinds of telegraph financing. For example, the most influencing business lobbies invested directly in the most important submarine telegraph companies while, the same lobbies tried to influence on the government decisions about the national telegraph network development (which was public).Starting from the British case of study (Great Britain was the only country where telegraph service was managed either by private companies or by public administration) one will describe who, why and how invested in telegraph infrastructures in the second half of XIX century.
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Masterminded in the 1830s and subjected to much experimentation in the following decade, the telegraph had already entered everyday life in the 1850s. Then in the second half of the century international telegraph systems, brought together by the integration of numerous interconnected national telegraph networks linked by long undersea cables, went through an extraordinary period of expansion. The aim of this paper is to identify and describe the principle methods of financing the infrastructures which made such an intense development possible. Though this papers refers to the global/international system in general, it will be examining only the ways in which infrastructures were financed in Europe, and will be leaving aside for the moment the particular case of the United States.
In order to indepth the reciprocal influence of technical and economic variances, reference will be made to the literature of the Large Technical Systems (LTS), and the European variant (Macrosystéme technique, MST), integrated where opportune with the considerable literature on nineteenth century telegraphy and appropriate primary historical sources. In the first section it will be explained why the global system of telecommunications can be considered an LTS/MST, and for what purposes. The concept is used in this paper as an object of study, leaving in the background the methodological approach developed from it. The following sections will analyse the infrastructural technologies of telecommunications, ways of running them and their influence on typologies of financing. The last paragraph will be dedicated to the development of a case study which represents an exceptional meeting point between the two main methods of financing adopted in the telegraph sector.
The global system of telecommunications (1850-1900)
The worldwide system of telecommunications, which goes back to the creation of individual national systems around the 1850s, was re-enforced in the same decade by international treatises and technological innovations giving rise to international connections 2 . Nevertheless, the international telegraph system was only really able to define itself as such with the laying and operating of the first intercontinental cables in In this paper the term "system" is specifically adopted in place of the more frequently used "network", normally considered a synonym. In scientific language, however, a network is only one of the components of a macro-technical system 5 , and in the history of technology there are two major definitions of a technical system: the "Macrosystème technique" (MST) of Europe influence 6 and the "Large Technical System" (LTS), created by Thomas Hughes and then used mainly by American scholars 7 . The two definitions obviously differ in greater or smaller methodological nuances 8 , though in both cases the system features three main aspects: 1) an industrial object, the telegraph, at the centre of the system; 2) a complex of infrastructures forming the network, e.g. the international telegraph network; 3) a public or private company carrying out a commercial activity via the network, generating a service, just like the telegraphs 9 .
LTS are normally subdivided into subsystems in order to simplify analysing them 10 . In the case of the international telegraph system, it is particularly necessary to identify at least two levels of sub-systems, in order to allow a thorough investigation of the financing of infrastructures.
First of all, on an operative level the international telegraph system was divided into national systems. Each state had originally organized its own service, which it either ran directly or gave in concession to privates. In any case, each country had the right to autonomous regulations just as it was free to decide tariffs and adopt the technologies it judged most opportune. with by big joint stock companies and private capital. Obviously, the different way of organizing them gave rise to two different modes of financing, but before going into the subject, it is better to illustrate the essential features of two kinds of infrastructures.
Land telegraph lines
Land telegraph structures were composed basically of offices and the lines connecting them. The telegraph lines, the only infrastructures to be considered in this paper, were in turn composed of three basic elements: 1) wires; 2) poles; 3) insulators.
The wires could be made of different metals. Copper or iron, two metals with very different characteristics, were normally used. Copper makes a better electric wire than iron, but it is far less resistant than iron to being twisted and subjected to strain. And outdoors, the metal wire was often subject to the effect of atmospheric agents like wind and snow, which could twist or strain it. Furthermore, to be fastened to the poles the wire needed to be pulled from one supporting pole to the next without suffering damage. It is easy to understand therefore why by the 1850s, many states had already opted for iron wire 11 .
The poles holding up the wire lines were obviously essential for the correct long-time working of the telegraph service. They were always made of wood, given that it is a very poor conductor, and thus guarantees a negligible dispersion of electricity. Another Insulators were another technological component essential to the development of telegraph lines. The purpose of insulators was to avoid power dispersion during communication by keeping the wire insulated from the iron support it rested on.
Insulators, made of glass, ceramic or porcelain, were of all sorts of shapes: bells, inverted mushrooms, etc. As for the materials, the least efficient was definitely glass, which was more likely to trap moisture and therefore disperse more electricity. The best was definitely porcelain, which repelled moisture and was therefore more reliable in very damp locations 13 .
To sum up, land telegraph structures were made of structurally simple elements and constructed with easily obtainable and inexpensive materials.
The running and financing of the landlines.
All over the world, except in the States and the UK, national telegraph services were directly in the hands of the State. In the case of landline telegraphs the question of infrastructural financing appears to have been less important for at least two reasons: 1) the public running of the service; 2) the low cost of telegraphic infrastructures automatically limited the number of financial instruments available for raising the capital needed for constructing telegraph lines. In theory, telegraph administrations could have medium term bank loans, alternatively, they could resort to issuing bonds. In reality, at least up to the early nineties, these instruments were rarely used for landline telegraphy, which relied mainly on self- 2) sounding the seabed to ensure the safe laying of the cable; 3) the transport and immersion of the cable; 4) the reception of electronic impulses over long distances 22 .
The first problem of the cable's impermeability was mostly resolved with the application of gutta-percha, a natural rubber imported mainly from Asia 23 . The first submarine cables were constructed about 1855 24 ; as years passed, they were gradually perfected, but their structure remained more or less the same 25 . There were one or two conducting wires in the centre 26 , which served for transmitting the electric current. The wires were then wrapped in a layer of gutta-percha, to ensure they were impermeable 27 .
The isolated wires were held together with a mixture of tar and hemp, again to increase impermeability. To ensure resistance to possible external mechanical agents, the cable was armoured, i.e. strengthened on the outside by a spiral of thick steel or iron wires 28 .
period ( the largest investment in telecommunications up to then ) using a surplus from the previous year (Legge 24 marzo 1907, n°111, art.2.). This merges also from the words and writings of the telegraph managers of the time, who insisted that parliament would have to allow investments in lines and technology provided by the continual income generated by the service itself. The morphology of the seabed had to be examined before the cable could be laid. They had to avoid at all cost, for example, suspending the cable over two peaks, so that the middle part floated at the mercy of the currents. The only known method in the period for checking on the seabed was to measure depth via continued soundings.
Given the steel armour, the cables were very heavy. The kind of ships needed had to be able to transport great weights and be equipped with mechanisms for laying cables. At first, very large craft adapted for transporting and laying cables were used. Then new ships were custom built. Cable ships were equipped with enormous rollers the cables were wrapped round, while enormous chain-pulleys connected to the rollers slowly lowered the cable into the water. During the operation the personnel had to be careful that the cable was not damaged, which would have ruined all the work done. To avoid any ugly surprises the cable was tested as it went down. Sometimes the chain pulleys could not hold the weight and dropped the cable in water, totally out of control 29 . In order to receive the weak electric current that had crossed thousands of miles in an intercontinental cable, telegraphs more sensitive the Morse, like the siphon, were invented 30 .
To sum up, the technology required for building, laying and running cables were complex, refined and called for heavy investment, both in the infrastructures and in research and development.
The running and financing of submarine lines
In comparison to landlines, the running of submarine telegraphy was different in two he directed an aggressive campaign for acquiring and merging submarine telegraph companies, partly by exploiting the British desire to create the famous "red line", i.e. a network of cables linking all the Empire's dominions, owned totally and run completely by the British.
From the 1870s, the big business world threw itself into the adventure of the submarine cables just as it had done thirty years earlier in the railways and this allowed an extraordinary international expansion of the sector, led above all by British capital, men and technologies. The technological characteristics and financial needs of land and submarine infrastructures were poles apart: the former low-cost, state-constructed and state-run, the latter capital and risk intensive and therefore created and run by jointstock companies. These two worlds, so distant from each other, found a exceptional meeting point during the important historic event of the nationalization of British telegraphy in 1869.
The nationalization of British telegraphy: an attempt to find capital for submarine telegraphy?
Great Britain was the first country in which the electric telegraph was patented and then offered as a public service 35 The British telegraph service was never run in a system of pure competition, given the entry barriers making access very difficult for newcomers. The telegraph service market presented at least two: 1) patents protecting all technical innovations; 2) obligatory payment of the so-called "way leaves", where telegraph lines were built alongside railway lines, roads or canals 39 . These constraints finished by favouring first mover companies like Electric and Magnetic, which managed to maintain their position of privilege in the market even after the arrival of other competitors.
In the sixties the companies worked in an oligopoly, keeping to unspoken real and proper cartel agreements in the early part of the decade and then making them explicit in the later part. What happened was that between 1860 and 1865, the five major companies specialized in different niches of the market so as not to cause damage to one another 40 .
In 1865 the three most important companies signed a tariff agreement which abolished the single charge in force since 1861 in services between the major cities. In reality, the first to introduce a single tariff had been United back in 1860; to avoid losing customers
Electric and Magnetic had decided to adopt the same tariff only in links between the cities also served by United. Thus none of the three drew any advantage from the price change, which was the reason why the cartel agreement came into force 41 . However, the disappearance of the single tariff led to an increase in the average telegram charge, so causing a savage reaction from the main users. Chambers of commerce, acting in the interests of businessmen and the press, started a public campaign against private companies, which was to lead a few years later to nationalisation.
The motivations behind businessmen, press, railway companies, Parliament and Government (which represented widely the first three power groups) backing nationalisation were more numerous than those which emerged during the debates preceding the passing of the Telegraph Acts. They fall into three categories: economic, political and technological. The economic reasons were partly linked to the definition of a natural monopoly, according to which a monopolistic management of some services allows it to be extended also to less profitable areas and dispense it with lower prices.
To these official motivations were added; 1) the desire to put communications under government control, also to guarantee free competition 2) the desire to join the International Telegraph Union which was only open to nations who ran their service directly; 3) the need for a higher level of technical standardization 42 . However the international policy motive more cogent for the purposes of this paper was the desire of the British Government to create a "red line" for controlling all the territory in the Empire. In the second half of the nineteenth century the United Kingdom was in fact the only nation to possess the technology and financial resources to construct long intercontinental telegraph cables 43 . Given that it was aiming to set up an under seas telegraph network connecting all the territories of the Empire with the Mother Country without passing over foreign soil, it was felt such a network had to be run by British companies alone 44 . In this way the Government wanted to guarantee for itself "red lines" of communication with its own territories so that no one could break in easily in time of war 45 . The project was brought to termination in the 1890s, thanks to the considerable contribution by John Pender 46 .
Following the exemplary case of John Pender, it could be conjectured that one of the main reasons underlying the British landline telegraphs nationalisation had been to make available the capital to invest in under seas companies. In other words, the ample compensation for all the shareholders of the landline telegraphs favoured the use of these freed resources in buying into under seas telegraph companies. In this way Government and Parliament favoured indirectly the construction of the desired services wholly in British hands. And these, unlike landlines, exacted heavy fixed costs, and therefore a heavy initial capital investment. This would justify the need to free financial resources to favour the expansion and completion of the "red lines" 47 . Furthermore the hypothesis of a indirect incentive rather than direct help in building links with the dominions would be reinforced by the failure of the subsidies policy to submarine companies adopted in some famous cases in the 1860s 48 .
However fascinating this theory is, and however personified in John Pender's vicissitudes, its point of weakness lies in the difference between landline and under seas telegraph companies. In the 1860s the former were a fairly solid medium-long period investment: the main landline companies (Electric and Magnetic) yielded in fact quite high profits for almost a decade while the under seas companies, instead, were notoriously high-risk investments. In conclusion, telegraph landlines could be a sure investment for businessmen while under seas ones were high-risk and therefore a good buy for speculators and carpetbaggers. Consequently, most of the shareholders from the private landline telegraphs were unlikely to throw themselves into buying under seas telegraph shares. They proved more attractive to expert businessmen, more inclined to wager. And they, well represented by John Pender, would hurl themselves into the new market of under seas cables with the same audacity with which some years earlier they had acquired shares in landline telegraphy, a service which at its origins had been semiunknown and little used.
Conclusion
From an examination of the international system of telecommunications on the whole, it has been possible to isolate the technologies, forms of organization and therefore dynamics of financing most used in the sector. Furthermore from the two great subsystems of nineteenth century (overland and under seas) it has emerged that the grade of complexity and therefore the level of cost of the technology necessary influenced decisively the choice of managerial typology and type of entrepreneurial organization. The easy availability of basic materials and simplified structure of the land lines favoured the choice of a public management, entrusted to a public administration.
Diversely, the high costs and risks caused by the complexity of submarine telegraphy made the first engineers create joint-stock companies, a model then followed by more expert business men once the sector was revealed as highly profitable. Nevertheless, the British case shows quite clearly that deterministic conclusions must be avoided and that technology was an important variable, but not the only one, to influence the choice of a managerial model and financing technologies. The United Kingdom was in fact the only European case in which the initial running of land telegraphy was entrusted to private companies. That happened because traditionally other great communications (roads, canals and railways) had always been run by privates and because the liberal economic policies dominant in Victorian Britain wielded more power than technology.
Furthermore, it needs to be remembered that the United Kingdom was the first country to adopt the telegraph service and at the very beginning the land telegraphy too seemed a costly, experimental technology just like the first submarine telegraphy and therefore a model run privately by means of a joint stock company was judged the most appropriate.
emblematic case of a strong correlation between two subsystems featuring completely different technological and organizational paradigms. Given the aim of this paper, it is important to underline that such a correlation took place when submarine telegraphy was suffering from an urgent need for capital. Submarine cables were a sub system of the international macro-system of telecommunications and not an independent system. It is in the light of this macro-system that can best be understood a phenomenon like the nationalisation of telegraphy, in part conditioned by the need for a high level of capitalization for one subsystem at the cost of the other, which could be maintained with a lower level of investment.
